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Abstract
The security infrastructure is ill-equipped to detect and deter
the smuggling of non-explosive devices that enable terror at-
tacks such as those recently perpetrated in western Europe.
The detection of so-called “small metallic threats” (SMTs) in
cargo containers currently relies on statistical risk analysis, in-
telligence reports, and visual inspection of X-ray images by
security officers. The latter is very slow and unreliable due
to the difficulty of the task: objects potentially spanning less
than 50 pixels have to be detected in images containing more
than 2 million pixels against very complex and cluttered back-
grounds. In this contribution, we demonstrate for the first time
the use of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), a type of
Deep Learning, to automate the detection of SMTs in fullsize
X-ray images of cargo containers. Novel approaches for dataset
augmentation allowed to train CNNs from-scratch despite the
scarcity of data available. We report fewer than 6% false alarms
when detecting 90% SMTs synthetically concealed in stream-
of-commerce images, which corresponds to an improvement
of over an order of magnitude over conventional approaches
such as Bag-of-Words (BoWs). The proposed scheme offers
potentially super-human performance for a fraction of the time
it would take for a security officers to carry out visual inspec-
tion (processing time is approximately 3.5s per container im-
age).
1 Introduction
At the turn of the 21st century, the modus operandi of ter-
rorist attacks in the West such as those in Madrid and Lon-
don, often relied on the use of explosives. However, with the
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2008 Mumbai attacks, Western governments have become in-
creasingly concerned about the possibility of “Mumbai-style”
attacks. These concerns have been further compounded by
the recent events in Tunisia, France, and Belgium. These at-
tacks have shown the devastation possible using only so-called
“Small Metallic Threats” (SMTs). It is thus necessary to detect
and disrupt the SMT smuggling routes to prevent such devices
from getting into the hands of would-be terrorists. While air-
port and aviation security is almost total, other routes such as
road, rail, and maritime remains vulnerable to smuggling at-
tempts. Automated detection of such threats remains an open
research endeavor.
Potentially, any one of the hundreds of millions of cargo
containers shipped globally each year could be exploited by
malicious actors to smuggle security threats, such as SMTs,
across borders. Currently, statistical risk analysis and intelli-
gence reports drive targeted inspection efforts [1, 2] but those
measures are unlikely to remain sufficient against increasingly
sophisticated smuggling schemes. Instead, security agencies
are pushing for a significant step-up in non-invasive inspec-
tion capabilities [3], with transmission X-ray scanners being
the most commonly used imaging modality for cargo contain-
ers [4]. However, current detection capabilities are not ade-
quate to accommodate the increasing volumes of images. In-
deed, the manual inspection of X-ray security imagery is a
painstaking process [5]. Images of cargo containers pose the
most difficult inspection challenge: threats (e.g. SMTs) are of-
ten very small relative to the image size (e.g. 0.1% of pixels in
a 2600×850 pixel image is typical); threats concealed within
legitimate cargo can be almost undetectable to the naked eye
due to complex or dense obscuration; and the diversity of ob-
jects that can be found in a container make it impossible for the
officers to learn the complete range of appearances for benign
items.
In order to alleviate these issues, we propose the use of
computer vision and machine learning techniques for the au-
tomated detection of SMTs in single-energy single-view X-
ray cargo images. This approach provides multiple advantages
over manual inspection: i) orders of magnitude reductions in
inspection times; ii) improved and potentially super-human de-
tection performance; iii) computing power can be scaled up
to meet the increasing volumes of images to inspect; and iv)
greatly simplifies scanning logistics by offering consistent pro-
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cessing times. However, most state-of-the-art computer vi-
sion methods were developed for natural imagery (photogra-
phy) first and foremost, from which X-ray images differ sig-
nificantly due to their translucency, noise levels, clutter, and
skewed perspective [4, 6, 7].
Conventional computer vision methods that rely on “hand-
crafted” features designed for natural images are thus unlikely
to perform optimally when applied to X-ray images. Rather
than adapting existing features, or deriving novel ones, one can
instead use representation-learning methods whereby features
that optimize the separation of different image classes are learnt
directly from training images. Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs), part of a family of learning algorithms known as Deep
Learning (DL), are representation-learning methods [8] that
were recently shown to significantly outperform other com-
puter vision approaches [9]. The main barrier to the application
of CNNs to X-ray imagery is the scarcity of training images:
threats are rare in Stream-of-Commerce (SoC) and acquiring
images of staged smuggling attempts is prohibitively costly and
time-consuming. In other fields, this issue was addressed by
augmenting the training dataset through the use of synthetic ex-
amples [10, 11]. In this contribution, we employ a dataset aug-
mentation method where physically-accurate images are syn-
thesised by projection of threats into SoC images [12], enabling
the generation of very large number of de-novo examples with
very diverse appearance. We also show that log-transforming
input X-ray images significantly improves SMT detection per-
formance.
This paper is structured as follows. First, related research
is discussed in Section 2. The methods used, including data set
augmentation, CNN architectures, and performance evaluation,
are described in Section 3. Our main findings are presented and
discussed in Section 4 before concluding in Section 5.
2 Related work
The urgent need for robust methods to fill the detection capabil-
ity gap is not being matched by the current research output in
automated analysis for X-ray cargo images, which was recently
throughly documented and reviewed in Ref. [13]. Impressive
performance has been reported for the detection of security
threats (including SMTs) [7, 14–16] in baggage X-ray images,
partly made possible by the small dimensions and complexity
(e.g. constrained packing and low diversity of objects) of bags,
as well as the availability of data-rich and high resolution imag-
ing modalities, including multi-view and volumetric scanning.
In comparison, scenes in cargo container imagery tend to be
much larger and complex, little constraints on how goods are
arranged, and a very large and diverse space of possible objects
(i.e. any object that physically fits into a cargo container). As
such, it is expected that performance for cargo images would
be in general lower than what has been reported for baggage
imagery.
Two methods for the automated verification of manifest
information based on machine vision algorithms were de-
scribed [6, 17]. Zhang and colleagues [6] developed an ap-
proach for the classification of X-ray cargo images into 22 cat-
egories (e.g. grain, tires) based on a Bag-of-Words learnt from
responses to Leung-Malik filters. The categories of 51% and
78% of images were in the top and top three categories pre-
dicted by their scheme, respectively. Tuszynski al. [17] com-
puted a city block distance to measure the distance between
intensity histograms of log-transformed images and those of
training images for each of the 92 categories considered. Based
on this distance, the scheme proposed by the author was able
to verify that a given image was associated with the correct
category with 48% accuracy and a 5% false alarm rate, which
was a significant improvement over chance. When using the
same approach to predict the category of the imaged container,
the category of 31% of the imaged container was correctly pre-
dicted, and it was in the top five predictions 65% of the time.
Approaches were also proposed for empty container veri-
fication, which is useful to avoid unnecessary subsequent pro-
cessing and to detect “false empties” [18, 19]. Rogers et al. [18]
classified cargo container images as empty or non-empty based
on a set of fixed geometric features (oriented Basic Image Fea-
tures), image moments, and the coordinates of sampled win-
dows learnt by a Random Forest classifier. The use of win-
dows coordinates as a feature encouraged the classifier to learn
location-dependent ranges of appearance. The authors reported
99.3% detection with 0.7% false alarms on SoC images, and
90% detection with 0.5% false alarms for synthetic adversarial
examples where objects equivalent to 1L of water were placed
in empty containers. Andrews et al. [19] used anomaly detec-
tion techniques, based on features extracted from the hidden
layer of an auto-encoder, to perform the same task, achieving
99.2% accuracy by training the system solely on down-scaled
images of empty containers and considering non-empty images
as anomalies.
We recently reported on the first use of Deep Learning for
the detection of cars in complex X-ray imagery and reported
that Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) significantly out-
performed conventional Bag-Of-Words (BoW) methods with a
100% detection rate and fewer than 1-in-454 false alarms raised
from containers without a car present [20]. The scheme cor-
rectly detected cars in cases where they were almost completely
occluded by other goods. “Small Metallic Threats” (SMTs)
are significantly more challenging to detect than cars: i) small
form factors, ii) very large number of models and manufactur-
ers, iii) appearance close to that of legitimate cargo, and iv)
unrestricted orientation. We previously presented preliminary
results for the detection of SMTs in small 256×256 patches at a
conference, with the additional caveat that the most challenging
cases (dense backgrounds) were left-out of the analysis [21]. In
this contribution, we present results for the automated detection
of SMTs in full-size images and with performance evaluated
across all types of background. In addition, we explore vari-
ous network architectures and compare performance between
pre-trained and trained-from-scratch CNNs.
3 Methods
3.1 Dataset and Data Augmentation
Benign images used for this work were acquired using a
Rapiscan Eagle R©R60 rail scanner equipped with a 6MV linac
source. Images are 16-bit, grayscale, and their size varies
between 1290×850 and 2570×850 pixel for 20 and 40ft
long cargo containers, respectively. The resolution is ≈6mm
pixel−1 in the horizontal direction. The images were randomly
sampled from Stream-of-Commerce (SoC) images acquired
over several weeks and can be empty (≈20% of the dataset)
or contain pallets of commercial cargo, heavy machinery and
industrial equipment, household goods, and bulk materials.
SMT images were acquired separately and are part of a pro-
prietary dataset. In total approximately 700 instances of SMTs
were available across all types, models, and poses. The original
scans were not used directly, but instead individual instances
were extracted to create a database of SMTs, which in turn was
used to synthesise de-novo examples for training. The synthe-
sis process, based on the multiplicative nature of X-ray trans-
mission image formation, was described elsewhere [18, 21] and
has recently been shown to be indistinguishable from real threat
imagery [12]. In short, a patch containing a single SMT in-
stance was first cropped out of the full-size image. Pixel-wise
segmentation of SMT instances was carried out manually, re-
sulting in a SMT binary mask. Background correction was per-
formed by dividing the cropped patch by the mean intensity of
pixels outside of the SMT binary mask. If unrelated objects
or structures appeared in the patch (e.g. parts of other SMTs
or supporting structures), the corresponding pixels were also
ignored during background correction. The SMT instance can
then be projected into another X-ray image by intensity multi-
plication.
Projecting the same SMT instance into different images re-
sults in vastly different appearances due to the translucency
property of X-ray images. The dataset is made more diverse
by the injection of realistic variations such as intensity scaling
and flipping.
In order to train the classification scheme, 1×105 SoC im-
ages were randomly sampled and SMT instances were pro-
jected into half of them. 75% and 25% of the dataset was used
for training and testing, respectively. There was no overlap be-
tween training and testing data, neither in the SoC backgrounds
used, nor in the SMT instances projected.
3.2 Performance evaluation
For performance evaluation, it was assumed that images of
the negative class (i.e. images without SMTs) would gener-
ally produce lower image scores pI than images of the positive
class (i.e. images containing at least one SMT). Various per-
formance metrics were computed based on pI scores obtained
for images in the test set, including the area under the ROC
curve (AUC) and the H-measure. The latter is a variant of
the AUC that addresses issues related to underlying cost func-
tions [22, 23]. In addition to the AUC and H-measure, the false
positive rate (FPR) was determined by thresholding pI using
the t90 threshold that resulted in a 90% detection rate.
3.3 Classification scheme
The detection of SMTs in X-ray cargo images was imple-
mented as a binary classification task, with benign images (no
SMTs) taken as the negative class and SMT images (at least
one SMT) taken as the positive class. The image classifica-
tion scheme is window-based: i) small windows are densely
sampled with a stride s; ii) windows are classified and given
a score pw,i (the confidence that the i-th window contains a
SMT or part thereof); iii) whole-image score pI is computed as
the maximum score across all windows; iv) image class predic-
tion is obtained by comparing pI with a threshold t90. Training
was thus conducted on a per-window basis, while performance
evaluation was carried out based on full-size scanner images.
i) ii) iii)
Figure 1. Effect of the log-transform on X-ray images of bolt
cutters. Image i) shows a photograph of the imaged bolt cutters,
while ii) and iii) show the raw intensity and log-transformed
images, respectively. Note: bolt cutters are used for illustration,
the SMTs of interest are often much smaller.
For classification by CNNs, the window size was 256×256
pixels and the stride s was 64 pixels. When comparing with
Bag-of-Words (BoW) approaches, the window size was re-
duced to 64×64 pixels and the stride s to 32 pixels to maximize
BoW performance.
Prior to classification, images were preprocessed [18, 21]:
i) black columns produced by faulty detectors or source mis-
fires were removed, ii) source intensity variations were cor-
rected by normalization based on air intensity values, and iii)
salt-and-pepper pixels were replaced by the local median in-
tensity. Raw intensity experiments use preprocessed images as
input. When specified, images were log-transformed prior to
classification; this transform is frequently used to facilitate de-
tection of concealed items by security officers during visual in-
spection (Fig 1) and was also previously applied to automated
classification [17].
In addition to the computation of the image score pI , a
heatmap was generated during classification by mapping the
normalized mean window score at each location (across all
windows overlapping at that location) to pixel values. These
visualizations serve two main purposes: i) clarification of clas-
sification decision by approximately localizing detected SMTs
(or the source of false positive signals), and ii) to serve as a
guide to further action by the security officer (e.g. physical
inspection).
TFS-A TFS-B
INPUT
CONV
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TFS-C
Figure 2. Trained-from-scratch (TFS) network configurations
evaluated. A. Single channel input images, B. Two channel
input images, and C. Two input images feeding into separate
convolutional layer streams.
3.4 Convolutional Neural Networks
The main type of CNN evaluated in this contribution
were trained-from-scratch (TFS) using the MatConvNet li-
brary [24]. Their architecture is based on the very deep net-
works first described by Simonyan and Zisserman [25], where
multiple convolutional (CONV) layers with small 3×3 filters
are stacked in-between “max pooling” layers and feed forward
into three fully-connected (FC) layers. 11-layer (8 CONV + 3
FC) and 19-layer (16 CONV + 3 FC) variants were explored.
For both variants, three configurations were evaluated (Fig. 2):
grayscale image input (TFS-A, raw or log-transformed in-
tensities); dual channel image input (TFS-B, raw and log-
transformed intensities); and separate raw and log-transformed
inputs to distinct branches of the network (with no weight shar-
ing) whose features are concatenated after the first FC (TFS-C).
In all cases, the window score pw,i was given by the output of
the softmax layer for the positive class.
Batch normalisation (fixing the mean and variance of input
distributions at each layer) was used for network regularisation
and to speed up training [26]. Weight decay and momentum
were fixed at 10−4 and 0.9, respectively. Learning rate was
decreased from 10−3 to 10−6 over the course of 30 epochs. The
mean image computed across the training set was subtracted
from each input image. In addition, images were also randomly
flipped (horizontally and/or vertically) at training.
In addition to TFS CNNs, pre-trained (PT) networks were
also evaluated. Features were extracted from the FC1 and FC2
layers of a VGG-VD-19[25] model, whose architecture is very
similar to the 19-layer TFS CNN, trained on ImageNet (dataset
of natural photographic images) and were classified using Ran-
dom Forest classifiers. Input images were resized to 224×224
and the grayscale channel was replicated twice in the third di-
mension to match the expected RGB format. For PT CNNs, the
window score pw,i was computed as the fraction of trees voting
for the positive class.
3.5 Bag-of-Words features
In addition to CNNs, Bag-of-Words (BoW) features were also
evaluated: oriented Basic Image Features (oBIFs) and Pyramid
Histograms Of visual Words (PHOW). BIFs are fixed geomet-
ric features, classifying each pixel of an image into one of seven
Table 1. Performance for the detection of SMTs in X-ray cargo
images. For clarity, some results were omitted from the table.
“+Log” denotes that images were log-transformed prior to clas-
sification. FPR90 is the false positive rate for a 90% detection
rate.
Method AUC H-measure FPR90
oBIFs 0.72 0.19 0.72
oBIFs + Log 0.59 0.04 0.88
PHOW 0.72 0.18 0.75
PHOW + Log 0.73 0.20 0.75
CNN-19-PT-FC1 0.67 0.17 0.86
CNN-19-PT-FC1 + Log 0.61 0.12 0.89
CNN-19-PT-FC2 0.67 0.17 0.85
CNN-11-TFS-A + Log 0.95 0.72 0.13
CNN-11-TFS-B 0.95 0.70 0.15
CNN-19-TFS-A 0.89 0.53 0.47
CNN-19-TFS-A + Log 0.96 0.75 0.09
CNN-19-TFS-B 0.97 0.78 0.06
CNN-19-TFS-C 0.96 0.75 0.10
Figure 3. SMT detection on an empty container using a selec-
tion of the algorithms evaluated. Images have been scaled so
that a value of 1.0 (red) corresponds to a false positive detec-
tion for a 90% true positive rate. The best performing scheme
is marked *.
categories according to local symmetry [27]. For this work, we
used the extended formulation (oBIFs) where the orientation
of rotationally asymmetric features is quantized, resulting in
16 new categories, for a total of 23 [28]. The oBIF computa-
tion was carried out at four scales (σ={0.7, 1.4, 2.8, 5.6}) and
two threshold parameters (γ={0.011, 0.1}). These parameters
were previously shown to be optimal for detection of cars in
cargo containers [20]. The feature vector for a window was
184-dimensional.
PHOW were proposed as a multi-scale extension of dense
SIFT (Scale-Invariant Feature Transform) [29, 30] and are
computed as follows: i) computation of dense SIFT for the im-
age considered at four scales (4, 6, 8, and 10 pixel spatial bins);
ii) learning of a 300 visual word dictionary by k-means cluster-
ing of dense SIFT; and iii) computation of a two-level pyramid
histogram of visual words (2×2 and 4×4 spatial bins). The
resulting feature vector was 6000-dimensional.
Random Forest models were used for classification of im-
Figure 4. SMT detection on a busy container image that does
not contain a SMT using a selection of the algorithms evalu-
ated. Images have been scaled so that a value of 1.0 (red) cor-
responds to a false positive detection for a 90% true positive
rate. The best performing scheme is marked *.
ages based on oBIFs and PHOW features.
4 Results
The SMT detection performance obtained for the different
methods evaluated are presented in Table 1 and summarized in
Table 2. These results highlight the challenging nature of this
classification task. Overall, Bag-of-Words (BoW) methods per-
formed poorly; the best AUC and H-measure was achieved by
PHOW on log-transformed inputs while oBIFs had the lowest
false positive rate for 90% detection rate (FPR90) with 72%.
Interestingly, log-transformed inputs slightly increase perfor-
mance of PHOW but was detrimental to that of oBIFs, poten-
tially due to non-optimal parameter choices.
Pre-trained (PT) CNNs have previously been applied suc-
cessfully to X-ray imagery and delivered robust baseline per-
formance [16, 20]. However, they generally fared worse than
BoW approaches for SMT detection, indicating that generic
features that are optimal for natural image classification, and
that perform reasonably well for the detection of large objects
in X-ray images, are not directly transferable to this task.
In all cases, trained-from-scratch (TFS) CNNs outper-
formed both BoW methods and PT CNNs. It was found that
log-transforming the image was key in achieving improved
performance. For example, log-transforming inputs when us-
ing a single channel input (TFS-A) decreased the FPR90 from
47% down to 9%. A smaller but still significant improve-
ment was obtained by using inputs with both raw and log-
transformed channels (TFS-B), resulting in a further 3% drop
in FPR90 to 6%. Surprisingly, the network architecture that has
two separate streams of convolutional layers for raw and log-
transformed input images did not perform better than just us-
ing a single log-transformed input (TFS-A + Log). One could
expect that encouraging the network to learn channel-specific
features would improve classification given the difference in
appearance between the two channels. Potentially, this could
be explained by the much more complex network over-fitting
the training data. The FPR90 was more that doubled when us-
ing a shallower network (19-TFS-B versus 11-TFS-B), indicat-
[h]
Figure 5. SMT detection examples using CNN-19-TFS-B.
SMTs are deliberately censored by a red rectangle (the dimen-
sion of the rectangles is identical to that of the SMT). i) to iii)
shows SMTs concealed in the fabric of the container while iv)
and viii) are placed amongst legitimate cargo.
ing that the added complexity did not lead to over-fitting in this
case.
When processing a benign image of an empty container,
the TFS CNNs are the only methods that did not lead to ex-
cessive false positive signals (Fig. 3). Similarly, when given a
benign image of a container loaded with industrial equipment
and objects, whose appearance closely resemble that of SMTs,
PT CNNs and to a lesser degree BoW methods generated very
large number of false alarms (Fig. 4). In contrast, only a few
image locations had any kind of signal associated with them
when using TFS CNNs, and in the case of the dual-channel
input variant, no instance was above the threshold to trigger a
false alarm.
Examples of successful detections using CNN-19-TFS-B
are presented in Figure 5. In most cases, the signal is well-
localized and the classification very specific, especially when
projected into empty containers (Fig. 5.i and ii). The examples
where the SMTs are concealed amongst other cargo (Fig. 5.iii-
viii) would be very challenging to detect by visual inspection,
especially under time pressure.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a Deep Learning scheme for the detection of
“small metallic threats” (SMTs) in X-ray cargo images. Using
a novel method for the generation of a suitably large and di-
verse dataset of physically-realistic synthetic images, Convolu-
tional Neural Networks (CNNs) could be trained-from-scratch.
We report a 1-in-17 false alarm rate for 90% detection, which
significantly outperforms other methods evaluated, including
classification based on pre-trained CNNs and Bag-of-Words
features (Table 2). The processing time using a Titan X GPU
was 3.5 second per image in average, which is significantly
lower than the time taken by operators to inspect cargo con-
tainer images.
Table 2. Summary of best performance obtained for each ap-
proach (see Table 1)
Method AUC H-measure FPR90
BoW 0.72 0.19 0.72
CNN-PT 0.67 0.17 0.86
CNN-TFS 0.97 0.78 0.06
The scheme described could potentially result in a step
change in SMT detection capability. However, further research
is required before it is ready to be deployed in the field. Due
to the lack of real images containing SMTs concealed amongst
legitimate cargo, we have relied on synthetic images for per-
formance evaluation. While all efforts were made to evaluate
the system in a way that is meaningful and as representative of
real-real world performance as possible (e.g. by using fully dis-
joint datasets for training and testing, for both threats projected
and background patches), it is essential for performance to be
evaluated based on real images showing realistic placement of
SMTs.
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